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THE DOCTRINE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY*
Background paper 1985
Abstract:
The concept of rule of law has been recognized repeatedly in twentieth century political
and philosophical discussion, but with a constantly shifting meaning. In this paper we document
most of the serious contributions to thought about rule of law before 1985 as a background to
further work on the topic.
Key words: rule of law, legal theory, philosophy of law, natural law, F. A. Hayek,
constitutionalism,
=====================================================================
Since the theory of natural law as a foundation and imitation of the positive law has come
into question, the central jurisprudential issue has turned from an inquiry of what the substance
of the law should be to an inquiry of what makes law determinable. Some modern theorists,
generally not fond of legal positivism, have sought to derive limitations upon and characteristics
of the positive law from the principle that whenever possible the law should rule and not men.
Given that the doctrine of the rule of law these theorists are developing is a doctrine of antityranny, these theorists have not been content to say that the rule of law is extant whenever men
are ruled by positive laws. This positivistic tautology denigrates and trivializes the very ancient
doctrine of the supremacy of law so as to render it true of any state, ancient or modern, free of
tyrannous. Instead, the modern developers of the theory of the rule of law give it a great deal of
thought and attention precisely because they believe that it is best stated as a doctrine of antityranny and not just as another way of stating legal positivism.
In this writing the ups and down of the doctrine of the rule of law in the present century
shall be traced. Following the popularization of the term by A.V. Dicey in the latter part of the
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nineteenth century, we shall find that for the first sixty years of this century much attention was
given to the doctrine, culminating in its fullest expression to date, that given by F. A. Hayek. But
in the last twenty years the amount of attention has waned somewhat, both in quality and
frequency.
Although it is appropriate to begin a discussion of modern theorists on the rule of law
with Dicey, some mention should be made that the doctrine is not new to this era. The
supremacy of law is an age-old doctrine, and a brief treatment of its antiquity will be given in our
first section. The second part will treat Dicey and his commentary. Part three will evaluate the
many statements of the doctrine of rule of law between Dicey and the Hayekian development of
the doctrine, circa 1960, which is the topic of the fourth section. Finally, we shall summarize the
discussion which has taken place in the past twenty years, and evaluate the contributions made.
As we proceed through each part, we shall not fail to note, and probably cannot resist noting,
some infelicitous expressions which have been made along the way.

I

No more should need be done to illustrate the antiquity of the doctrine of the rule of law
than to find it in the writings of Plato. Indeed it is oft said that all succeeding political
philosophy is a footnote to and a commentary on Plato. At least one reason for such a hyperbole
is that despite centuries of lucubrations much disagreement is found among commentators as to
the stance of Plato in his most quoted work, the Republic. Plato has been accused of being the
sponsor of about every political "ism" known to man. Popper thought he was a great exponent of
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authoritarian regimes,1 while McIlwain states such a posture is a "distortion," the result of
disregarding "Plato's plain statements of his purpose in the Republic" and of ignoring the
Statesman, which plainly shows that this is not Plato's true position but the very antithesis of it".2
Regardless of which political camp Plato is properly placed, it is clear that he was aware
of the doctrine of the rule of Law. Barker comments that in the Republic Plato "had gone against
the cherished and current beliefs of his people--its belief in the sovereignty of law...--and he must
have appeared... as an advocate of that tyranny which the Greeks hated with such a perfect
hatred, because it murdered law and self-government and equality."3 But whether the Republic
advocates tyranny depends upon how seriously one takes the "ideal" society built in the work-and upon how seriously he meant it to be taken. For our purposes here suffice it to say that the
Statesman and the Laws have proved much less disputations, so much so that even Barker admits
that in these writings Plato sees the law "as the fruit of experience and invention of wisdom and
sees "the value of a democracy which is based on the rule of law.4
Aristotle, apparently happier with the clarity of the Statesman than the irony of the
Republic, picks up on many of the ideas of the former, including the rule of law. In the Politics
he stresses that "it is more proper that the law should govern than any of the citizens," that "only
guardians and servants of the law" should be in government.5
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Like Plato, Aristotle, refuses to associate the rule of law exclusively with democracy, or
democracy exclusively with the rule of law, for when "the people govern and not the law" the
democratic state embodies nonetheless the rule of men in which "everything is determined by
majority vote and not by law." When such a situation persists, a free state is not extant, "for,
when government is not in the law, then there is no free state, for the law ought to be supreme
over all things." 6
In the Rhetoric, we even have a statement which shows an attempt to compose a list of
the elements of the rule of law: "It is of great moment that well drawn laws should themselves
define all the points they possible can, and leave as few as possible to the decision of the judges,
[for] the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members
of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brought before them."7
It is often a lesson in humility to study the thought of the ancients, for it teaches us the
egotistic view we often have of our own institutions and concepts of government is undeserved.
This eye-opening experience is also available in a study of medieval political thought. The
theory of practice of government in the medieval age serves as a worthy proem to modern
developments, particularly in the area of the rule of law, although it must be admitted that to
some extent their theory was better than their practice.
In Britain, for example, a thirteenth century commentator by the name of Bracton wrote
"Rex non debet esse homine, sed sub Deo et sub lege quio lex facit regem": The king should not
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be under man, but under God and law, because law made him king.8 Bracton taught that the king
has full power in the administration of government, or gubernaculum, but beyond this, in the
realm he called jurisidictio, "there are bounds to the king's discretion established by a law that is
positive and coercive, and a royal act beyond these bounds is ultra vires."9
It is strikingly pleomastic to quote a thirteenth century Frenchman by the name of
Beaumanoir. He states, "L prince n'est pas sus la loi, mès la loi est sus le prince; quar il li
donèrent tiel privilege comme il avoint": The king is not above the law, but the law above the
king; for the laws give him his position.10 A century later, Hincmar, Archibishop of Rheims,
wrote that nobody, not even the king, may disregard the law.11 In the sixteenth century Seyssel
wrote that a stable and long-lived monarchial regime will occur "when the head is regulated by
good laws and civil customs."12 Kings as well as commentator believed in the supremacy of
laws. Pepin, in a comment that typifies the common view of monarchial power only in its use of
the royal "we," said, "Inasmuch as we shall observe the law toward everybody, we wish
everybody to observe it toward us."13 Charles the Bold vowed to "keep law and justice" and
Louis the Stammerer was sworn to "keep the customs and laws of the nation."14 In medieval
8
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France, as well as in England, the realm of the king's power was executive or regulatory in
nature.
Expressions of the supremacy of law were also prominent in medieval Germany.
"Germanic and ecclesiastic opinion were firmly agreed on the principle...that the state exists for
the realization of the Law; the power of the State is the means, the Law is the end--in itself; the
monarch is dependent upon the Law, which is superior to him, and upon which his own existence
is based"--15 Monarchs had a duty to protect the law, for in his view the king was enjoined to
maintain the customary law, to uphold the legitimate rights of individuals, and to safeguard the
possessions of the State." In the same coronation oath, it was "impressed upon the
Consciousness of the people the dependence of the king upon the law," after which the
acclamation of the assembled people was given.16 As it was said in these times "Nieman ist so
here, so daz reht zware": no one is so much Lord that he may coerce the law.17
Kern identifies three sources for the binding of the medieval monarch to law: custom, the
Stoic law of nature transmitted by the Church Fathers, and the Christian ideal that the king is
God's vicar and instrument.18 The second and third of these influences are incorporated into the
medieval version of natural law, which the first identifies custom. Thus the king was regulated
by law and custom in order to prevent tyranny, defined by Seyssel as domination of pure will.19
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It is true that these two courses were very much integrated and the natural law theory is now
dead, its demise is not fatal to the doctrine of the rule of law. We shall see as we explore the
developments of more recent times that the important thing is that there is a standard antecedent
to the state. As we trace twentieth-century thought we shall see that a modern standard is
available which does not depend upon natural law underpinnings, and which may be said to be a
viable jurisprudential theory differentiable from both natural law and legal positivism.
While there was no paucity of theory supporting the rule of law during the middle ages,
there was a dearth of institutional controls and sanctions to prevent and punish abuses of power.
This assessment applies to antiquity as well as to medieval times. In the ancient regime there
was "no remedy for an unconstitutional act short of actual revolution."20 In the medieval era, the
king was liable to receive resistance if he infringed the law, but only that: "The supremacy of
law, in other words, was not guaranteed by regular institutional controls."21 Such devices are the
virtue of modern constitutionalism.22 The medieval era shows the roots of those devices, to be
sure, particularly in the area of representation and consent, but it isn't until later that they really
flower.
By skipping to Dicey we do not mean to infer that the doctrine of the rule of law lapsed in
the interim. Rather, the doctrine is mentioned by several notables, and to bridge the gap just a
bit, we shall refer to a few. Hobbes, for example, picked up on Aristotle's phrase, although he
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thought it was an error that "not men should govern but the law."23 Harrington responded that
"the act whereby a civil society is instituted and preserved upon the foundations of common
rights and interest...[is], to follow Aristotle and Livy, the empire of laws, not of men."24
Locke, while not mentioning the traditional phrases associated with the rule of law, does
state the "whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth is bound to
govern by established standing laws promulgated and known to the people, and not by
extemporary decrees"25 or by the "irregular and uncertain exercise of the power."26 "Freedom of
men under government," he wrote, "is to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of
that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all
things, where that rule prescribes not: and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, arbitrary
will of another man."27 To mention the other branches of government as well as the legislative,
Locke argues "...indifferent and upright judges.... are to decide controversies by those laws
[promulgated by the legislature]; and to employ the forces of the community at home only in the
execution of such laws"28; while the "supreme executor of the law...has no will, no power, but
that of the law."29
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Many characteristics of the rule of law, even though they also did not use traditional
phrases associated with the doctrine, were expounded upon by Paley and Beccaria. Paley
commented chiefly on generality,30 while in the main work of Beccaria may be found the
elements of clarity, certainty, foreseeability, enforcement, and equality, as well as generality.31
Kant writes: "The greatest problem of mankind, the solution to which nature compels
him to seek, is the establishment of a civil society in which administers the rule of law."32 This
underscores the strong German tradition of the rule of law and limited government, the
Rechtsstaat.33
To Dicey goes the credit for popularizing the term "rule of Law"34 and much that it
entails. Dicey, a savant of the British constitution, discusses the rule of law along with the
sovereignty of Parliament and the conventions of the constitution in his work Law of the
Constitution. These three principles are presented as axiomatic characteristics of the
development of the British constitution.
The rule of law in this context, Dicey states, has three main elements.35 First, there can be
no punishment without a violation of the established law, or the principle of nullum crimen, nulla
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poena sine lege.36 A violation once asserted must be proven in the ordinary courts before any
deprivation in property, freedom, or person may be exacted. Dicey expressly contrasts this
principle with a system of government which includes bodies with wide discretionary powers.
This implies that it is violative of the rule of law to punish a person who could not have known
beforehand that his action was subject to state sanctions. Dicey obviously feared that
government agencies with broad discretionary powers would determine the legality of an action
after the act and this would produce arbitrary enforcement and undefinable rules. It is plan that
for Dicey the rule of law is a doctrine of anti-tyranny.
Second, the rule of law means that no person is above the law or that every man is subject
to the law. All men are not only subject to the same law, the law will be enforced against all men
in the same ordinary courts. This is the traditional concept of equality.
Third, the rule of law is an expression of the nature of the laws of the British constitution:
that they are the consequences of rights as defined by the courts. This element is in effect an
affiliation with the common law tradition.
It should be noted that each of Dicey's principles are expressed in terms of the courts, and
most restatements of his position are cognizant of that. One can look to Hewart for evidence as
to how in Britain the rule of law came to be stated in the Dicean manner,37 and Pound in America
saw the rule of law as the equivalent of the common law doctrine that the judiciary may
pronounce upon the legal validity of actions of administrative, executive, and legislative
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authorities.38 Dicey undoubtedly perceives the independent courts and the common law heritage
as the bulwark and foundation of the rule of law, particularly in terms of historical development.
By making reference in each of his elements to the virtues and responsibilities of the ordinary
courts, Dicey emphasizes his belief in the superiority of the judiciary in safeguarding rights and
preventing tyranny as opposed to administrative rule in particular.
These elements of Dicey's concept of the rule of law can be traced to Blackstone, De
Lolme, Ferris, Cox and Hearn, all of which had praised the British constitution for its ability to
provide for the supremacy of law.39 In 1775, De Lolme, a Frenchman, hailed the British
constitution because under it violations of law whether done by the prince or the pauper were
redressed.40 More prefatory to Dicey is the work on the British constitution os Cox, in 1813,
which contained a chapter entitled "The Supreme Power of the Law." In it he states that "every
class of persons in England is subject to the laws" and that "it can scarcely be disputed that in no
other country is the supremacy of the law so effectually guarded."41
Ten years before the publication of the Law of the Constitution, Dicey characterizes the
rule of law as not only a feature of the British constitution, but as the essence of all British
political institutions.42 He intones that the doctrine of the rule of law has arisen from the
evolution of political institutions: "the curious paradox which lies at the basis of English
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institutions [is] that the great power of the crown was in a sense the cause of the ultimate
freedom of the people....[T]he power of the king first checked the lawlessness of the nobility,
then established a uniform system of law and of direct taxation which still forms the foundation
of the English scheme of government and administration,and lastly accustomed the English
people to that rule of the severe but always fixed and definite law which is the real glory of
English institutions, and which, in ages when arbitrary government was universally established
throughout the rest of Europe, made the English constitution, with all its obvious defects, seem
the most beautiful phenomenon in the history of mankind to all statesmen and theorists interested
in the welfare of the human species."43
It is under this heading of the rule of law as the result of the evolution of institutions that
Dicey's three principles emerge. To Dicey goes due credit for having made the rule of law
famous,44 and for formulating in a rudimentary fashion of the elements of the doctrine.

III
A major critic of Dicey is Jennings who takes issue with the Dicean conception of the
rule of law on about every point. Jennings attempts to reduce the doctrine of the rule of law to a
dilemma. "If it is only a synonym for law and order, it is characteristic of all civilized States; and
such order may be based on principles which no democrat would welcome and may be used, as
recent examples have shown, to justify the conquest of one State by another. If it is not, it is apt
to express the political views of the theorist and not to be an analysis of the practice of
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government. If analysis is attempted, it is found that the idea includes notions which are
essentially imprecise."45 This excerpt fairly well capsulizes Jennings' attack, which, in addition
to responses directly aimed at Dicey's three principles, has three prongs directed, it seems, at the
viability of and value of formulating the doctrine of rule of law at all: first, the rule of law may
simply be the same as rule of the law of any law--even the command of the totalitarian; second,
Dicey's conception was too intimately tied with his political views, so that rule of law is just an
expression of a view of public policy which laments the growth of the service state; and third,
even if the first two prongs proved invalid, any attempt to formulate the doctrine would
necessarily involve concepts so hopelessly imprecise as to render the result of dubious worth.
The point of this section is that Jennings' three prongs recur in variant forms among multifarious
writers until the doctrine is in great need of repair, and it may be said that the mission of Hayek's
Constitution of Liberty is to make such repairs and improve the formulation of the doctrine in
such a way that the three areas of concern should be of no consequence. Before we proceed, it
would be pointed out that as much confusion is inserted by well-meaning but careless enthusiast,
particularly near the time Hayek was writing, as may be said to have originated from those who
think the doctrine to be of no value or contribution.
It is clear that the role of law, as developed by the ancients, the medievals, and up to and
including Dicey, is a doctrine of anti-tyranny, and that the rule of law is not merely the same as
rule by law, which if taken in this latter sense, would stretch the doctrine so as to encompass the
entire ambit of states. For if it were meant by the rule of law merely rule by law, then, as
Jennings points out, that is true even of the most despotic state..., even if that law be only 'The
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Leader may do and order what he pleases.'"46 The rule of law is meant to be used as a standard
which free states may be differentiated from totalitarian states; it is explicitly contrary to the rule
of will. "In the term 'Rule of Law,' as used by Dicey, 'rule' has the connotation 'to rule' rather
than 'a rule.'"47 Jennings understood this, and his use of the point is to create a dilemma: if the
rule of law is simply rule by law, then every state possesses the characteristic, and the doctrine is
tautological and largely useless;if it means more than this, then what the theory entails must be
fleshed out which leads a theoretician like Dicey to encounter other difficulties, namely prongs
two and three of Jennings' argument.
Phillips, an early respondent to Jennings' attack, states that "The dilemma is a false
one....The Rule of Law does not imply merely the existence of public order. It implies an
enforcement of public order by methods which are compatible with freedom."48 Dicey's small
list of elements is not an attempt to deftly dupe his readers into his political persuasion; it is to
identify the characteristics which the rule of law had historically been said to possess. The mere
assertion that these characteristics are remarkably close to Whig values does not deny their
authenticity. The discovery of difficulties in determining and identifying such elements and their
nature does not render the process unfruitful, nor does it falsify individual elements.
To put the implications of the doctrine of the rule of law in a most forceful manner, it can
be said that legal propositions which do not comply with the elements of the rule of law are not
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laws at all, but commands. From the making of this distinction the elements of the rule of law
have been historically and theoretically derived. Although we may seek to refine the model and
experience some discomfort at not being able to fully explain particular elements, we must not
lose sight of the role the doctrine of the rule of law has played as being contrary to the rule of
will.
Legal positivism, on the other hand, knows no such distinction, and expressly defines law
in terms of command. Hence many commentators in the twentieth century have never been able
to view the rule of law in any other way than as rule by law, or as rules of the law, as a lawyer
commonly uses the term. It is fitting here to quote Paton, who is responding directly to Dicey's
three principles, but misses the point completely that the rule of law is not just another brand of
legal positivism. Indeed, contextually, Paton is identifying the rule of law as one theory of the
relationship between the state and the law, differentiable from positivism because, true to its
medieval heritage, it considers the law as being above the antecedent to the state. But as he
discusses this view, he refuses to take the meaning of the term "the rule of law" as it is used by
Dicey, and slips into the language of legal positivism by using the term "a rule of law." Here is
Paton's statement concerning Dicey's three principles: "These are undoubtedly the characteristics
of the past and are not logical deductions from a rule of law. For law may have a varying
content; it may protect the subject against despotism or give the most ruthless power to a tyrant.
It is not enough for the democrat to demand a rule of law--everything depends on the nature of
that law. Every legal order which functions has a rule of law; this applies to Nazi state as well as
a democracy."49
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Other spokesmen refuse to consider the rule of law in any other manner than in lawyer's
terms, as in a particular rule of or about the law, or, more generally, in positivistic terms, as in
rule by law, any law, as though the entire history of the term involving an entirely different
meaning is null, void, and defunct because it is contrary to the irrefragable truths of our
enlightened age. "The term 'rule of law' has no absolute and static meaning," writes Friedmann.
"In a formal sense, the rule of law means any ordered structure of norms set and enforced by an
authority in a given community. It is free from any ideological content and encompasses
tyrannous as well as liberal and humanitarian orders."50 Kelsen states,
"It is the task of the science of law to represent the law of the community, i.e., the
material produced by the legal authority in the lawmaking procedure, in the form of
statements to the effect that "if such and such conditions are fulfilled, then such and such
a sanction shall follow."
These statements, by means of which the science of law represents law, must not be confused
with the norms created by the lawmaking authorities.... The legal norms enacted by the law
creating authorities are prescriptive; the rule of law formulated by the science of law are
descriptive....
The rule of law, the term used in a descriptive sense, is a hypothetical judgment attaching
certain consequences to certain conditions."51
In another place, Kelsen does seem to consider the term in a manner closer to its heritage,
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but even so his intent is to refute the contention that the rule of law is incompatible with
socialism because the doctrine is associated with freedom. Kelson endeavors to dismiss Hayek's
view of the doctrine and its implications as developed in The Road to Serfdom. To accomplish
this end it must be realized that Kelsen adopts a conception of rule of law much different than
that of Hayek, and in the process emasculates the doctrine of its historical virility, using instead
the empty positivistic cant. "By the rule of law the principle is understood," he opines, "that the
administrative and judicial functions of the state should be determined so far as possible by preestablished general norms of law, so that as little as possible discretionary power is left to the
administrative and judicial organs; freedom is thus guaranteed because arbitrary government is
avoided."52 Thus misconceived, it is easy for Kelsen to conclude that the rule of law places no
restrictions whatever on the power of the legislative branch so that the "rule of law principle may
prevail although the whole life of the individual is regulated by general legal norms prescribing
in detail his behavior in relation to others, and thus restricting to a great extent his freedom of
action."53 The rule of law has as its purpose only to provide that the application of the law
conforms to the will of the sovereign body that created the law.
The point of this exercise is the positivistic treatment of the doctrine of the rule of law
inevitably exclude the historical precept that it is the opposite of rule of will. It is a tendency
among writers so inflicted to define the rule of law so broadly so as to include the entire
spectrum of government types, so at to render the doctrine meaningless and deprive it of its
essentially anti-totalitarian character. One even went as far as to say that the rule of law is a legal
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implementation of a particular ideology54, and it seems it does not matter that the ideology
selected might be totalitarianism. Perhaps this is because positivism's desire to eliminate any
ideology or moral sentiments from the study of jurisprudence, and the dispute of tyranny versus
liberty is a prima facia case of an ideologically based controversy, imbued with moral sentiment.
Anything conclusory on this topic is most likely tainted and the fruit of the poison tree. So even
when the effort is to present and refute the historical doctrine as preserved by Dicey and Hayek,as
attempted by Paton and Kelson, it is only accomplished by introducing brands of the doctrine
carrying positivism's trademark.
Hayek's conception of rule of law presented in The Road to Serfdom is also subject to
attack in the context of the second prong of Jennings' attack. Part of the dilemma presented by
Jennings echoes what has just been said about positivism. Jennings asserts that when Dicey
proceeds to flesh out the theory of the rule of law to something more than simply the rule by law,
he inexorably ends up with only a statement of his own political views. Jennings states that
Dicey's first principle, that of the supremacy of the regular law, "does not mean that powers
ought not to be abused; what he really has in mind is that wide administrative or 'executive'
powers are likely to be abused, and therefore ought not to be conferred."55 It was not too difficult
for Jennings to pick the mind of Dicey on this point, for Dicey explicitly states that the rule of
law "excludes the existence of arbitrariness, or prerogative, or even wide discretionary authority
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on the part of the government."56 But Jennings goes on to state that Dicey "was stating as a
principle of the British Constitution what he, and many others of his generation, thought ought to
be a principle of policy.... The 'rule of law' is this sense means that public authorities ought not
to have wide powers; that is, that the 'collectivism' which has infused the policies of all
Governments since Disraeli's is an undesirable principle. The 'rule of law' in this sense is a rule
of action for Whigs and may be ignored by others."57
Of course, one should not be surprised to discover that Dicey and Jennings were
politically on opposite sides of the fence. The rule of law was to Dicey a traditional, historical,
ancient doctrine signifying freedom from arbitrary government. It may be that Dicey felt some
affinity for the rule of law because of his political persuasion, or it may be that his political
persuasion was largely determined by his jurisprudential outlook. Whatever the case, there is no
doubt that Dicey's conception of the doctrine squares with its historical roots. On the other hand,
Jennings reflected a positive liberalism which advocates government intervention as the cure for
what ails us. One wonders then if the antagonist was not articulating his own political
philosophy in the guise of jurisprudence as much as the protagonist.
The fact is that much of the criticism of defenders of the rule of law focuses on the
assertion that the doctrine is simply "out of step with the times."58 Friedmann writes, "To me it is
inconceivable that, in the foreseeable future, the role of the state could be reduced--as it is
postulated by so many who indulge in half-baked nostalgias. This would not be so if our life
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could revert to the pattern of the eighteenth and earlier centuries,"59 which, of course, cannot be
done, and this assessment echoes the sentiment that it is the complexity of our times that
mandates--but not only mandates, necessitates--a pervasive and ubiquitous government
involvement in what used to be of purely private concern.
In the parade of critics of Dicey, we must add to the list Wade and Bradley.60 They write
"if it is contrary to the rule of law that discretionary authority should be given to government
department or public officers, then the rule of law is inapplicable to any modern constitution."61
This attack, while it incorporates the belief that Dicey is out of step with the times, is a bit more
sophisticated, for its hits Dicey where it might be expected to hurt the most. Dicey has presented
the rule of law as a characteristic of the British Constitution; Wade and Bradley are saying
though it may have been true then it is not true now. But we should not infer that Dicey would
have necessarily disagreed with this assessment. In the introduction of the eighth edition of his
work, Dicey is found reflecting on the changes he had observed since initial publication in 1875,
and states, "The ancient veneration for the rule of law has in England suffered during the last
thirty years a marked decline."62 Dicey does not alter his list of the age-old principles of the rule
of law simple because in some respects his government no longer honors them. Rather, he
encourages repentance.
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Another stance Dicey took in this vein for which he has been roundly excoriated is that it
is incompatible with the doctrine of the rule of law to erect a separate court system to handle
administrative law cases, but that such cases should be heard in the regular courts as the need
arises.63 Indeed, Dicey was writing in an age when "the rule of law" and "the cognizance of the
ordinary courts" were used convertibly.64 Pound defined the rule of law as "a characteristic
doctrine of the common law that the judiciary, in ordinary legal proceedings, may pronounce
upon the legal validity of...administrative, executive, and legislative action..."65 But there is some
evidence that Dicey mellowed somewhat. The almost rabid disgust for the French administrative
court system found in the first edition of Law of the Constitution is moderated in the eight
edition by recognition of improvements, although he still had serious reservations.66 The fact
that Dicey could in a categorical manner evaluate a system of administrative courts may infer that
the problem is more of a problem in creating appropriate safeguards rather than one so serious
that a blanket prohibition is warranted.67 It at least ought to be understood that a system of
judges subject to all the restraints typical of common law judges is obviously compatible with the
rule of law whereas administrative officials doing double duty as rule-maker and rule-enforcer is
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highly suspect.68 But even further, if a conflict between the rule of law and powerful
administrative agencies seems inevitable, certainly we should prefer as "the best permanent
solution...a reduction in the amount of government to which we are subjected."69
At least we trust that limiting administrative discretion is better than removing concern
for the problem from the doctrine of the rule of law. But Kadish and Kadish say the latter has
already been accomplished: "The sharp restriction of delegated discretion is no longer regarded
as one of the essential features of the rule of law model.... The expansion of government's role to
deal with problems of urbanization, industrialization, and technology in the public interest have
made it inevitable that substantial discretionary authority be delegated to government officials."70
Similarly, Hayek encountered the wrath of most commentators when he suggested that it
is contrary to the rule of law to have government planning of economic affairs because such
planning could not accomplish its ends without creating particular laws for particular individuals
or groups and without creating an environment in which an individual could not adequately plan
his own affairs because he could not reasonably foresee when his action would contravene or be
countered by the will of the state. But when Hayek's conclusion is attacked, it is not attacked on
the basis that there is a flaw on his conception of rule of law, or on his ratiocination from the
premises given by the rule of law. Rather, opponents counter him only at the public policy level,
and never at the theoretical level. Friedmann, for example, believes that the spoiling of
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individual plans by unforeseeable actions of others occurs constantly in the unplanned society.71
Other arguments for the planned society even at the expense of the rule of law include the need
for efficiency in administration and the maximization of the "public interest."
The extent to which the rule of law survives this onslaught is determined by the extent to
which we will allow public policy to determine the elements of a jurisprudential theory instead of
vice-versa. Do we sanction the creation of burgeoning and blundering bureaucracies when "it is
the very law of bureaucracy's being that it should strive to do things in its own 'efficient' way
with the minimum of legal restraint, and that it therefore constantly seeks, often in spite of itself,
to dispense itself from law?"72
What we have been discussing is directly relevant to the question as to whether the rule of
law is compatible with the modern welfare state. Of course, it is difficult to find compatibility
and accept Dicey's definition of the rule of law. The answer of some is like the answer of
Jennings': if the rule of law means no welfare state as we know it then we have no rule of law,
and they go on supporting programs which empower the bureaucracy, considering the demise of
the rule of law as no great loss or as something unneeded in these progressive times. There is
next, of course, a middle ground, which says that we may have our cake and eat it too, if we just
make minor adjustments. Those who temper the conflict see the rule of law as a strictly
procedural dogma, with no substantive tenets.73 As long as a due process and procedural justice
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is maintained the rule of law prevails,74 and, it appears, the state is not otherwise bound. Others,
like Hayek, see the welfare state as the road to serfdom. Pound said that "unless we are vigilant,
the service state may lead to a totalitarian state."75
The third prong of Jennings' attack is the doctrine of the rule of law is extremely
imprecise. Jennings is able to agree that if there is a viable doctrine of the rule of law it must
involve limitations on the power of political authorities, equality before the law, and liberty, but
believes that each of these involve disputation and are so hopelessly imprecise that any theory
based on them would be inherently problematic.76
Yet it is by precisely identifying the elements of the rule of law that much of the
bothersome imprecision can be removed. If a list of characteristics inherent to the concept of the
rule of law can be derived, then an identifiable and exportable standard would result, which is not
dependent for its formulation on a particular state at a particular time. Although it is safe to say
that Hayek in The Constitution of Liberty makes the first attempt to exhaustively identify these
elements, it has not been uncommon for writers to associate with the rule of law certain
characteristics that appear in the literature repeatedly. We have already noted, for example, that
Aristotle offers a list of elements that includes prospectivity, generality, a separation of powers,
and a limited role of judges by reducing judicial discretion as much as is practicable. Paley and
Beccaria hold up what we now call the elements of the rule of law as a standard by which all law
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can be measured, and we could add to that list Burke, who writes that "The properties of law are,
first, that is should be known; secondly, that is should be fixed, and not occasional."77
The most commonly discussed element is generality, a term used by Bentham78 and
defined by Rousseau as follows: "When I say that the object of law is always general, I mean
that he law considers subjects en masse and actions in abstract, and never a particular person or
action....In a word, no function which has a particular object belongs to the legislative power."79
More recently, Patterson has written that a "proposition of law is general because its terms refer
to an indefinite number of individual instances, in contrast with a term which refers to an
individual instance or a definite number of individual instances."80 Neumann calls this
"generality of formulation" and adds "a general law contains the demand for the inadmissibility
of retroactivity. A law which provides for retroactivity contains particular commands inasmuch
as the facts to which the law refers already exists."81 It is little wonder that the principle of
generality has been called "the bedrock of the rule of law"82 because "Through its generality law
can be made to further two important ends of political justice, the elimination of the personal
prejudices of the official, and the equity between all claimants with respect to their claims."83
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The principle of equality under the law is obviously closely associated with generality,
but expands the impact of the rule of law upon the body of law to include enforcement. A
perfectly general law is of no efficacy in preserving the rule of law if it is enforced in an
invidiously discriminatory fashion. Other than this extension differentiating generality and
equality becomes more difficult. Dicey listed equality before the law as his second element, and
by that he specifies that both rule and the ruled are subject to the same ordinary law of the land.
The principle of equality carries with it the sense that it is applicable to the entire legal
apparatus,and when we say "equality under the law" we usually mean under the whole body of
law. On the other hand when we say that a law is general, we are talking about a particular
statute.
It is a point of dispute as to the policies governments must have in order to satisfy the
principle of equality. For example, MacIver echoes Dicey's formulation and then expands it:
"The rule of law...is violated if by reason of birth, status, wealth, or special privilege any
individuals or groups are legally exempted from legal responsibility for acts which if committed
by other individuals or groups would come within the cognizance of the courts....We might go
farther and claim that the rule of law is violated in so far as there are not formal but substantial
discriminations which prevent an equal access for a person to legal redress. The greatest of these
is the expense of the appeal to the law."84 It is this sort of thinking which leads us to provide free
legal counsel to indigent criminal defendants. But it is not clear that failure to do so provides us
sufficient evidence to substantiate a violation of the rule of law, since it is open to discussion
whether only formal impediments must be eliminated or must practical impediments also be
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included.
Leoni seems to pick up on the distinction made earlier that equality refers to the whole
body of law while generality refers to a particular law when he asserts that the principle of
equality is violated in a heavily regulated society wherein there may be "three or four thousands
of laws of the land--one for landlords, one for tenants, one for employer, one for employees,
etc."85
In such a state of affairs the principle of generality may be satisfied because all people
within a category are all equally under the law of that category, and the members thereof are not
identifiable. But the fact that such categories are created so that not all are subject to the same
law is, for Leoni, a violation of the principle of equality under the law because a different body of
law applies to one group as opposed to others.
Also related to the concept of generality is the element of foreseeability, which means that
an individual citizen of a state in which the rule of law prevails can know in advance what
actions invite prosecution for offenses. "Because of the generality of law," Patterson notes, "men
can be enabled to predict the legal consequences of situations that have not yet been litigated, and
hence to plan their conduct for a future which is thereby rendered less uncertain."86 Burin adds,
"Only if the law is general, addressing itself to an indeterminable number of persons and future
situations, can the Rule of Law fulfill its primary, protective role of making calculable the
incidence of government forces."87 One comment published in 1949 illustrates the applicability
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of this element as part of a standard by which adherence to the rule of law might be assessed.
Lord MacMillan said, "The ruthless despotisms which have afflicted large parts of Europe in
recent times and under which the citizen could never know from moment to moment what might
happen to him are the very negation of the law."88
It may be possible, save for the inevitable confusion that follows this course,for
government to regulate life in every particular and still satisfy foreseeability. It is not, however,
historically consistent with the rule of law for it to do so. Indeed the connection between the rule
of law and liberty is that both assert that there should be a sphere of action into which the law
does not intrude. The rule of law means that the law forms a line of demarcation between "an
area of individual freedom of action and an area of clearly defined prohibitions of individual
action..."89 "...[I]t is 'government under law' that makes it possible in our society to define, and
redefine, spheres in which a man's actions are not subject to governmental control."90 Not only
does the centrality of the existence of this private sphere of individual action associate the rule of
law with liberty, but it may also explain the doctrine's historical affinity with a free market
economy. Curtis asserts that "It is no coincidence that the Anglo-Saxon people who had carried
the principle farthest excelled in commerce."91
There is no foreseeability or demarcation of private sphere of individual action if the law
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is uncertain. Therefore, certainty is an opposite concern and an additional element of the rule of
law. "If a law is certain, the exercise of power can be considered separate from the person or the
authority exercising the power; accordingly, individuals before the court may be satisfied that
their conduct is punished because of previously established rules and not on the basis of rules
fashioned on the instant for their particular disadvantage."92 Indeed it has been argued that the
deliberate inclusion of uncertainty into a legal system, even if int he name of enhanced flexibility,
is the hallmark of a transition from a government of laws to a government of men.93
Correlatively, the rule of law is frustrated if the laws are not known or at least knowable. Public
enactment, enforcement, and publication of legal rules seems indispensable to the existence of
the rule of law.
It has been argued that "if a law is uncertain in its meaning, the distinction between lawmaker and law-enforcer collapses" and the "process of interpretation becomes indistinguishable
from the process of law-making and the exercise of judicial authority becomes legislative in
character."94 If the rule of law is to retain its essential character as the converse of the rule of
will, then it must be said that the judicial and executive branches in the process of enforcement
must not have and should not be perceived to have such extensive powers over the meaning of
the law that citizens remain uncertain of the impact of a law even if it is clear in its language.
This may require the institutionalization of a legal fiction. Judges, by the mere fact that
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legislation cannot anticipate all situations and relationships, do inevitably make law, but they
make a lot more when they perceive it as their duty or right to do so. It is therefore not
uncommon to see proponents of the rule of law assert that the doctrine "seems to require a
conception of law as being at any time a complete and existing system" and that "the judge has
but one function which is to find the law and apply it to the fact."95 The judge may indeed have
the effect of making law, but he is a better judge if he has the attitude that it is his responsibility
"to deal with the case before him in that way which was indicated by an interpretation of existing
authorities, rather than in that way which seemed to him on the facts to be the fairest or most
desirable from a social point of view."96 Such fictions characterize the common law, and explain
why deference to law and the common law are compatible traditions.97
Several times in this discussion mention has been made of the enforcement of laws, so it
will not be surprising to discover that the control of private lawlessness is also an element of the
rule of law.98 "Indeed, if sanctions do not exist, it can be said that the rule of law does not"
exist.99 Sometimes the rule of law is defined solely in terms of "The legitimacy of the law as a
means of ordering and controlling the behavior of all people in a society."100 As should be clear
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by now, the rule of law is much richer than that, but nevertheless enforceability is integral to the
doctrine's existence. Thus, rising criminality does, in a real sense, denote a decline of the rule of
law,101 which may be an important relationship to explore during the eighties, whereas after the
turbulent sixties it was wondered whether civil disobedience was compatible with the rule of
law.102
Of course, the relationship between the rule of law and public order may be said to have
two strands: "first, authority, which implies the coercive powers of enforcement, and second,
acquiescence, which implies genuine acceptance by a majority."103 The latter strand explains the
addition of the principle of consent to the elements of the rule of law: "Without some coercion,
there is no 'law,' but without the consent of the governed, there is no 'Rule of Law.'"104
To continue in this vein, it seems arguable that if the rule of law is to have an efficacy
then the laws must reflect the values of the society.105 It may even be that the society itself must
have certain values in order for the rule of law to be preserved.106 Not least among these values
is the old concept of public virtue, which means that people are willing to sacrifice and be
obedient to law in order that society might be preserved, and this is essential to the rule of law.107
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Dickenson gives the elements of the rule of law a different focus as he discusses the
impact of the rule of law upon legal change. He notes that unless a legal system gives due
deference to the doctrine, what is lost through too rigid and careless change may be greater than
any benefits derived. He cautions that four principles must be respected in order to maintain the
rule of law" first continuity, for "Law, like nature, does not grow by sudden leaps;"108 second
consistency, "in the sense that law must preserve at least a certain respect for ultimate
consistency in matters of substance is not always in points of logic;"109 third, reciprocity, "in the
sense of a reciprocal balance between rights and duties;"110 and fourth individualism, "in the
sense that law in the last analysis must deal with individual beings as its principle unit."111
Because of the connection which Dicey makes between the rule of law and the evolution
of the British constitution, namely that the rule of law is also a produce of history, Jennings
concludes that the rule of law is therefore "not a product capable of export" and that there are no
universal principles of government attached thereto.112 On the other hand, a more recent
commentator defends the rule of law as "the greatest contribution England has made to the
civilization of the world..."113
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It is one thing to talk about the rule of law as a custom or "the legal habit,"114 referring to
the doctrine's origins--or to a tradition of obedience to law, but it is quite another thing to discuss
the utility and exportability of the doctrine, its elements, and its appurtenances on particular
constitutional devices. Jennings has a point if he means that constitutional provisions or
particular state structures devised to insure and preserve the rule of law are not exportable
because their construction and utility heavily depends upon a country's heritage and culture. On
the other hand, if elements of the rule of law truly are elemental, they must be exportable, even if
they are gleaned primarily from European political history. Elements are here distinguished from
(to use Madison's well-known term) auxiliarily devices in that they are integral to the meaning of
the doctrine and that without them there could be no rule of law. Naturally, the universality of
the doctrine is based upon the assumption that the rule of law is always preferable to the rule of
will, no matter what the culture, country, or era. But the "outward structure or pattern of the Rule
of Law differs, and must differ, from country to country,"115 because institutional evolution and
cultural heritage must be accommodated. For example, wilson notes that the "written
constitution in Latin-American countries has often proved to be an ineffective barrier against
despotism."116
A chief contribution that we shall see Hayek making is expressing the rule of law in terms
of elements which then form a standard by which any country may be evaluated with respect to
its success at instituting the rule of law. On this basis, studies have been done of cultures
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considerably different than that of the roots of the rule of law. Using the doctrine as developed
primarily in Great Britain and Germany as the standard, Southern Rhodesia has been evaluated as
a highly creditable study.117 A study of Kenya included this important insight: "The validity of
the hopes attending the [Kenyan] Constitution...depended very much on the degree to which the
ruling constitutional philosophy took account of Kenyan realities. Since constitutions seek to
regulate vital dynamics of the exercise of power, great importance must always be attached to the
peculia history of a people and its key political concerns in the process of constitution-making.
Such particular attributes will not always fit into a formalistic conception of the rule of law
conceived in alien situations. It is here that the 'imported model' theory breaks down."118 It is a
mistake to simply import someone else's constitution and institutions and adopt them as one's
own; such attempts are doomed to failure because of insufficient attention to a cultural heritage,
which is best accomplished by using as much as possible existing institutions to achieve the rule
of law.
A somewhat ironic example of the use of the rule of law as a universal standard is found
int he study that suggested that Great Britain would be more in accord with the doctrine if it
reduced the power of its parliament, whereas West Germany would accomplish the same end if it
strengthened its parliament.119 Institutions and institutional adjustments are not subject to
universalization, but the elements of the doctrine of the rule of law aid in developing and
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evaluating the same.
The applicability of a standard derived from the theory of the rule of law has been taken
one step further in a study which attempted to compare devotion to the rule of law of the two
major American political parties as determined by voting records in Congress.120 The rule of law
statutory criteria developed in the study is based on the works of Hayek121 and Lowi.122 A statute
conforms to the rule of law if it is general, prospective, clear, publicly promulgated, drafted by a
governmental body not involved in direct enforcement, and subject to judicial review. It must
also minimize administrative discretion and treat equally individuals in applicable classification.
With regard to the latter requirement a statute may be applicable only to identifiable individuals
or situations. The study states that since rigid and maximized loyalty to the standard would quite
possibly mandate only a minimal state not at all envisioned or supported by either Hayek or
Lowi, that the standard is best used as a device that compares relative compliance rather than
absolute compliance.
The lesson here is that providing an intelligible rule of law standard can be or has been
developed, it will not dictate what form of government a state should have or the content of its
statutes, but it can be used to compare states as to the relative minimization of the rule of will
and compare policy alternatives to maximize a private sphere of individual action. The standard
is not or should not be so precise, even after the improvements Hayek has made (which will be
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identified shortly), that questions of particular institutional devices or particular statutes are
firmly and incontrovertibly settled. The standard will not say, for example, that a society with a
written constitution achieves the rule of law better than one without one. But it could evaluate
whether the United States with a written constitution is working better by the standard than Great
Britain without a written constitution, who may be working better in turn than the Soviet Union
who has a written constitution. The rule of law will not dictate whether there should be a law
prohibiting abortion or whether there should be government aid to the needy, but it has a great
deal to say about how an abortion statute is written, enacted, and enforced and it would evaluate
various welfare policies and their risks of affronting certain elements of the rule of law. Since
the rule of law does not set everything in concrete, there is still plenty of room for public debate,
for the rulemakers to follow their own lights, and for other criteria to be used in government
decision making. Impressive in this regard is probably most welcome, but despite this flexibility,
it must be said that this does not mean that rule of law sacrifices its paramount importance. It
does not mean that it is wise that short-term expedience prevail over long-term liberty; rather, it
should infuse into political discussion a heightened concern for the preservation of the private
sphere. It does not mean that only running a risk of violating the rule of law is a small and
insignificant matter. Rather it identifies ground that if governments dare tread upon it at all, they
must do it with extreme care, caution, and after much deliberation.
It was during the fifties and early sixties that we saw Jennings' worry about imprecision
undeniably manifested. But the impression did not come from scholarly attempts to limit the
doctrine in a coherent and cohesive fashion. For imprecision invaded what was heretofore
becoming a rejectable jurisprudential theory because the rule of law became, quite frankly, a fad,
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mainly among legal practioners, meaning lawyers, judges, and law professor. A host of
conferences were held, beginning with a 1952 meeting in West Berlin of lawyers from an
international spectrum to discuss alleged violations of individual rights in East Germany. Then
this meeting resulted in the International Commision of Jurists, "a non-profit, non-political
association whose purpose is the mobilization of the legal profession for the protection of human
rights and the expansion and fulfillment of the rule of law."123 The Comission had American
support from the American Fund for Free Jurists, Inc., a special committee of the American Bar
Association. The commission held conventions under the title of the International Congress of
Jurists and published a journal, the Journal of the International Commission of Jurists. In 1955
the Harvard Law School held a conference under the title of "Under Law." In 1957 the
International Association of Legal Science, an affiliate of UNESCO, conducted a meeting at the
University of Chicago to discuss "1) the Rule of Law as understood in the West, and 2) the Rule
of Law in Oriental countries."124 In 1958 this same organization sponsored a conference in
Warsaw, Poland, wherein socialists and communists defended their adherence to the rule of
law125 which amounted to saying, "Sure we practice the rule of law: everything is ruled by law."
Finally, in 1958 President Eisenhower proclaimed May Day as Law Day (perhaps to counter the
Soviet holiday). Speeches were made for several years by prominent people in the legal
profession in honor of the holiday, mostly delivered before civic groups and law students.
THe imprecision wrought by all this attention by the legal community was profound and
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will be discussed shortly, but not all the product was bad. The Inns of Courts Conservative and
Unionist Society, a gorup of British Barristers, published in 1955 a contribution in which they
suggested means by which "the rules of natural justice should apply to all administrative
decisions of a discretionary nature which might injure the subject,"126 although they said "the best
permanent solution is a reduction in the quantity of government to which we are subjected."127
Political science texts before and during this era treated the rule of law prominently, of which we
might cite the texts written by Wilson,128 Corry and Abraham,129 and Hitchner and Harbold.130
Nevertheless, the imprecisions commonly made by fans of the rule of law during the fifties is
probably what spurred Goodhart to write an article stating that the rule of law is not the same as
democratic government, rights dogmas, or rule by law, since such loose equaitons were
commonly made.131 Confusion along these lines, as we have remarked, changes the focus of the
rule of law from what McIlwain calls "[t]he one great issue that overshadows all others," namely,
"Between constitutionalism and arbitrary government."132 We will center upon the ostensible
connection between the rule of law and rights doctrines, since it is that implausible joinder which
led to most of the conferences and congresses on the rule of law.
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Since the Second World War, the rule of law "has come to be identified with the concept of the
rights of man,"133 or, in most recent terms, "Its key additional ingredients in this period have
been certain minimum standards of human rights."134 It is,of course, an errant view, whether it
considers the rule of law as a rights thesis or whether it considers the two theories merely
equipollent and compatible, because it removes from the theory one of its chief virtues, namely
that it does not rest upon moralistic, unempirical foundations as do rights based theories. Still,
the same tension is here present: in seeking a limitation upon government so as to overcome the
blatant deficiency in this area oflegal positivsim, some commentators feel the only recourse is to
include as an ingredient of the rule of law the principle "that the guarantee of individual rights is
intimately connected with that of the supremacy of the rule of law, or better, that it is but another
aspect of the same principle."135 Thus, commentators have gone so far as to define the rule of
law as the set of "basic value judgements."136
In the era when the rule of law was perceived as themost gallluptious thing ever to hit
jurisprudence, it was quite a temptation to transform the rule of law into a moralistic
desideraturm. In 1955, for example, the International Commission of Jurists associated the rule
of law and rights only in that the rule of law springs from rights won in the historic struggle for
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human freedom.137 By 1959, however, they had gravitated from expressing the rule of law in
termsof its historical growth and development to rephrasing it as a dynamic concept which
safeguards civil and political rights and established the social, economic, educational, and
cultural conditions necessary for the realization of these rights in this time of progressive social
and economic change.138 The doctrine has become not just an unfolding of history but a belief
system that can make history and form cultures becuase it is now attached to an expansive list of
rights. The ruleof law became defined as a collection of rights which permeates government and
charges it with a positive duty to make those rights effective, which list of rights in now
broadened to include various rights having to do with economic security.139
At times during this period of excitement over the ruleof law commentators would lapse
into the language of natural law and again associate rule of law with the antiquated theory. Many
asserted that if rule of law means anything at all it must mean "that there is a higher law against
whichlaws andordinances must be measured if they are to be treated as legitimate."140 What this
higher law is takes traditional forms: it is what is just, the law of God, etc. Perhaps themost
interesting discussion in this vein was one by a participant of one of themany conferences on the
rule of law of the era, who in his first discourse, had disputed all conception of the rule of law,
including that of Dicey and Hayek (in Road to Serfdom only), and then ended up in his second
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discourse saying he would improve upon the theory of the rule of law by positing what he called
"the Ideal of Just Law," based on the "ultimate values" of the Judeo-Christian tradition.141 But if
the rule of law is to have any viability as a full-fledged standard it shall have to stand on its own,
and not be simply rule oflaw, as the positivists would have it, or a reincarnation of natural law, as
others wish.
That the rule of law is mentioned by both burgeoning legal positivists and by die-hard
natural law theorists makes Jennings comment about imprecision a prophecy rather than merely
an evaluation. The enthusiasm of the legal profession for the rule of law in the late fifties and the
early sixties was a liability rather than a boon for the theory. Indeed, instead of a few legal
practicioners making studies in improving the theory, there were many whose contribution was
not "darkeneth counsel with words without knowledge."
Another misconception which arises out of this period of enthusiastic attention for the
rule of law as given by legal practitioners is that the doctrine means that everything should be
ruled by law. This erroneous simplification is riddled with irony-for the very doctrine which for
centuries has stood for limited government is advertised as a doctrine justifying the exposition of
government activity. It is as though the slogan of the rule of law is that law is the answer to all
things. One commentator notes, "The term 'rule of law' now is coming to mean that all activities
and relations between people should be regulated by law. It is argued that in an interdependent
society any action of an individual and any transaction between individuals necessarilly affects
other members of the society, so it is intolerable that there should be any activities or transactions
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that are not regulated by law. Since human beings cannot exist except in a society, and a society
is by definition interdependent, it follows that 'whatever is not compulsory should be prohibited.
This is coming to be the new meaning of 'the rule of law'; instead of protecting freedom, the new
rule of law annihilates freedom."142
This attitude, coupled with an ideology countenancing unrestricted governmental
regulatory authority, results in a trend away from the rule of law rather than toward it. Rather
than a last resort for social change, the law is now viewed as the primary instrument of change.
But this "mania for law-making," this "inflation of laws" actually discredits and devalues the
law.143 For example, if citizens are confronted with mountains of laws, it becomes impossible for
them to know when they violate a law, and, since violations seem inevitable, it may lead them to
more readily violate a law wilfully. "a paradox of our times is the decline of law in themidst of
the enactment of many laws."144
Another characteristic of the wide-spread enthusisam for the rule of law is the hope that
this doctrine would provide peace on earth--that the settling of disputes by law rather than by
war. A typical appraisal of the use of law in world affairs is: "The rule of law is the best known
and most respected concept developed by man since the dawn of civilization. It is the best
common ground that hte human race possesses upon which to erect a world order unifying all
men against war."145 Not only was their enthusiastic support for effective institutions of world
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government such as world courts, international arbitration tribunals, and multi-national
regulatory agencies, but some felt that the law that should rule ininternational affairs was natural
law: "The Law that is needed for international relations is the Law of laws....It is the universal
and eternal principles of right and justice...It was established by the providence that created the
universe and madeit subject to law."146 Despite the loud call for an international rule of law,
there may not be enough international public virtue to make it workable, nor is there sufficient
cultural uniformity to make it practical, and, falling far short of utopia as we do, we would be
better off--and the citizens of individual countries would be better off if we concentrated on
improving the rule of law nation by nation, rather than entrusting unrealizable hopes in a world
organization.
We saw before our discussion of Hayek that many writers can identify portions of the
doctrine. We saw an era fraught with misrepresentations. Hayek enters with the most
comprehensive look at rule of law to daye, and in this section we shall look at some writers who
have also attempted to dilineate the elements of the rule of law. It is one thing to express the
doctrine in general terms, or to discuss only limited particulars, or to say only what the rule of
law is not--that it is not a prohibition against bad law, that it is not majoritarianism, that it is not a
natural law doctrine,147 but it is quite another thing to attempt to construct a model of what it is.
Fuller, Lucas, Rawls, Rax, and Oakeshott have all, in varying degrees, made such an attempt,
although it is doubtful that they have really improved upon the product Hayek gave us.
Lon Fuller, when writing The Morality of the Law, was undoubtedly familiar with Hayek,
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although he does not creidt Hayek as being a precursor of his atempt to identify the elements of
the rule of law. Twice Fuller in his writings on the rule of law refers to Hyek's writings, once to
The Road to Serfdom148 and once to the Cair lecture,149 but never to The Constitution of Liberty.
His references are points of criticism, but only on relatively minor differences. It may be said
that the most important distinctions that can be made between Hayek and Fuller are rather
superficial, they are clearly in the same tradition. Indeed, much of Fuller's characteristics of the
law are also in Hayek's list.
Fuller identifies his elements as eight "principles of legality."150 He does not use the term
"legality" as Hayek does--as a synoonym for a body of particular laws as distinguished from the
rule of law as a metalegal principle; rather, it is farily said that he uses it as a synonym for the
rule of law.
The eight principles are, at root, "indispensable conditions for the existence of law at all,"
although Fuller cautions that perfection in compliance with the principles is probably an
unattainable utopia. Nevertheless, Fuller would say that regularized violations of some or all of
the principles identifies a state not in accord with the rule of law, and, indeed, a state without
law, at least so far as the violations occur. In a sense, Fuller is only saying that a state without
any rule of will, given the frailties of men, is not possible.
Fuller's eight principles are: first, generality, or that "rules must apply to general classes
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and should contain no proper names;"151 second, publicity or promulgation; third, prospectivity,
although there may be justifiable occasions for a retroactive law, and it is impossible to warrant
that even a law prospective on its face will not have retrospective effects, for "If every time a
man relied on existing law in arranging his affairs, he were made secure against any change in
legal rules, the whole body of our law would be ossified forever;152 fourth, clarity, which, for
Fuller, does not mean that at times it is not wise to depend upon the courts and experience to
clarify some terms ("Sometimes the best way to achieve clarity is to take advantage of, and
incorporate into the law, common sense standards of judgment tht have grown up in the ordinary
life lived outside legislative halls");153 fifth, consistency, or that the law should be as free of
contradictions asis humanly possible; sixth, possibility, or that the law should not demand the
impossible; seventh, constancy, or that the laws should not be changed too frequently; and eighty,
congruency, or that there is congruence between official action and the law, which would
incorporate procedural due process.
One critic of Fuller's conception, Sartorious,154 is satisfied that as a definition of rule of
law, the governance of human behavior by general rules serves well. He seems to think that
Fuller's eight points are subsumable under one principle, generality. But he also believes that the
rule of law means the establishment of an institutional framework inorder to hear disputes which
will occur even if Fuller's requirements for legality are satisfied. Of course, Fuller does not
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believe that his eight principles spell the demise of adjudication.155 But Sartorious has Fuller
saying that adherence to the eight principles of the rule of law is sufficient to restrain government
and insure just and moral laws. Sartorious states that Fuller's best defense to the contention that
even the most wicked legal system canpractice his eight principles is that, when viewed
holistically, the overriding principle which prevents a bad government is publicity. Publicity is
here prominent becuase Fuller believes badness cannot compete with goodness in the light of
day.
To Rawls, the rule of law is simply the same as formal justice, which is the imparital and
consistent administration of laws and institutions.156 It is not derived from the principles of
substantive justice as derived from his famous original positions, but it is a collection of
procedural norms, womewhat in the vein of Lucas, and a charaterization of how rules should be
expressed, as is typical of Fuller. This amalgamation is presented in four elements:157 first,
"ought implies can," which is meant to express the possibility of compliance as a defence;
second, like cases shall be treated alike; third, nullem crimen sine lege; and fourth, the tradition
notion of natural justice or, in modern nomenclature, the due process oflaw.
It is readily seen that this list is highly procedural in tone. True to his predecessors, the
rule of law for Rawls in no way restricts the content of the law. But missing from this
conception are elements which for others are inherent in the rule of law because they are derived
from its basic nature as a doctrine of anti-tyranny, such as the protection of a private sphere and
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minimal discretionary authority. It is true that Rawls associates the rule of law with liberty and
that it defines the legitimate expectations of the citizenry, but this is not the same as Hayek's
private sphere. Although it does not restrict the content of the law by identifying explicitly
impermissible incursions into the private sphere of individual action, Hayek's conception does
include the warning that it is violative of the rule of law to so exhaustively regulate human action
that the private sphere is eliminated. It is a subtle but important difference in approaches. Hayek
connects the rule of law to liberty in terms of its evolutionary history, by establishing connections
of both ideals and the nature of progress, and by protecting the private sphere. Rawls relates the
rule oflaw to liberty by stating that the law sets boundaries for man's liberties.158 Thus
contrasted, the approaches seem to be coming at the problem from two different directions.
Moreover, it would seem that a government infused with a respect for the rule of law as defined
by Hayek would be less likely to inordinaetly restrict the boundaries of the private sphere when
compared to a government adopting Rawls's conception.
Following Hayek, Raz states that a meaningful definition of the rule of law has two
aspects: "1) that people should be ruled by law and obey it, and 2) that the law should be such
that people will be able to be guided by it.159 From this definition Raz derives "some of the most
important" principles of the rule of law, after stating that htere is no point in attempting a
comprehensive list. Why the sompliation of a complete list would be a futile exercise is not
explained. The principles mentioned by Raz are: 1)prospectivity, 2) publicityi, 3) clarity, 4)
stability, 5) generality, 6) independent judiciary, 7) the principles of natural justice, 8) judicial
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review, 9) accessibility of the courts, and 10) limited administration descretion (the enumeration
is added).
The virtue of his treatment of principles one through five is that they can be defended as
necessary because of the centrality of the individual in his definition. Foreseeability is the key;
principles one through five preserve foreseeability, whereas the violation of them would abrogate
the rule of law as defined.
Raz's treatment of generality is worth noting. To him, generality is simply that the
making of particular laws is guided by public, stable, and general rules. Generality, in this
version, apparently has nothing to say about what the law says or how it says it, only how it
comes about. If generality is purely a procedural characteristic--and it has not been viewed as
such historically--this naturally does not preclude the hegemony from fostering inequalities by
creating privileges or enacting bills of attainder. Perhaps Raz feels generality cannot be any more
stringent becuase it does not necessarily follow from his fundamental definition of the rule of law
that a law which is directed to a single person or group is impermissible. Such a law, despite its
particularity and specificity, must be obeyed and the actor affected can foresee the consequences
of actions. It is irrevlevent that others may not be affected whatsoever by the law since that is
foreseeable as well. On the other hand, a law enacted not according to public, general rules of
procedure does not facilitate foresee-ability on the part of the actor.
Raz notes that principles six through ten are descriptive of the judicial machinery.
Although he does not speak in terms of making a transtition from one level of analysis to
another, as many of the last five elements seem a step or two removed from his fundamtental
definition, unlike the first five elements. The mere fact that one discusses a particulr institution
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rather than a one-step derivation from the central definition shows a transition from one leve of
analysis to another has taken place. These institutional safeguards act more to preserve
priniciples one through five.
According to Raz, the value of his conception is that it is not tied to a particular set of
values, and he seems to think Fuller's morality of the law is so bound. Raz claims the rule of law
to be serving any purpose. He states that "the rule of law is just one of the virtues the law should
possess" inorder for the law to be good.160 But an effort such as Fuller's which attempts to find in
the rule of law a necessary connection between law and morality fails because it is grasping for
things that are not there.
Raz's analysis despite its pretention of purity, and one not uncluttered by moral premises
must deal with what is sacrificed when his conception is compared to the long rule of law
tradition. Already mentioned in his procedural characterization of generality which is
impercipient of its traditional treatment as a rule of how statutes may be expressed. Even a brief
look at the historical conception of the rule of law shows that the element of equality is
conspicuously missing from Raz's analysis. In fact, Raz assets that a legal system based on the
denialof human rights, on extreme poverty, or racial segregation, or sexual inequalities, and on
religious persecution, may actually be more in accord with the rule of law than a society which
seeks to eliminate or at least ameliorate those social ills. Raz, it seems, recongizes that a
definition of the rule of law is not optimally tied to the good society in terms of specific social
goals or institutions. On the other hand, if in the process he includes a toothless version of the
principle of generality and excludes the principle of equality, a ruler can create self-serving laws
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andnot violate any of the principles, and Raz, in an effort to be morally neutral, has sacrificed in
the process the doctrine's anti-despotic stance. It is a mistake to try to reformulate the doctrine
while ignoring its past; rather we should look at the process of developing the doctrine as model
building, in which we are only trying to capture the essence of the past for the benefit of the
future.
Oakeshott begins his recent essay on the rule of law by covertly trying to distinguish his
product from Hayek. He says the rule of law is often conceived "as a description of what a state
might perhaps become, or what some people would prefer it to be."161 Although Oakeshott does
not explicityly identify Hayek's work as an attempt with this sort of misdirection, it is clear that
he see himself as offering a strikingly different approach becuase he fundamentally disagrees that
it is profitable in terms of improving the doctrine of the rule of law to be about the business of
fleshing out the definition by adding elements, characteristics, attributes, and the like. One
dilemma which arises in such attempts is that while a list of attributes of the rule of law is sought
it is recognized that these attributes are probably not extrinsic to law as convention, and hence it
is of dubious value as an external standard. Oakeshott also appears to feel that such attempts
then tend to develop amodel of what a rule of law state would look like, and this is an error. In
another apparently advertent reference to Hayek Oakeshott states, "...themore discerning
apologist (recongizing the inconsistency of attributing the virtue of a non-instrumental mode of
association to its propensity to produce, promote, or even encourage a substantive condition of
things) have suggested tht its virtue is to promote a certain kind of freedom."162 Oakeshoot calls
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this aproach "misleading because freedom does not follow as a consequence of the rule of law so
much as it is inherent in its character--at least that is the proper place to mention liberty.
The rule of law is defined very broadly by Oakeshoot. It stands "for human beings
associated in terms of the recongition of certain conditions of associatioin, namely 'laws.'"163
"The expression 'the rule of law,' taken precisely, stands for a mode of moral association
exclusively in terms of the recongition of the authority of known, non-instrumental rules (that is-laws) which impose obligations to subscribe to adverbial conditions in the performance of the
self-chosen actions of all who fall within their jurisdiciton."164
The questionis what sort of laws, bodies of law, or states does this broad definition
exclude? Does this definition conjoin rule of law with legal positivism?
One way to exclude undesirable states of human association is to precisely define law in
such a way that not all that passes for law would be valid in a system devoted to the rule of law.
This, of course, is precisely the motivation for deriving a body of characteristics, and before he is
through, some sort of statement of elements is going to emerge despite his apparent rejection of
Hayek. In fact, such a collection must be present in order to achieve rule of law rather than rule
by law or "rule by policy," as Oakeshott would put it.
Like Hayek, Oakshott asserts that whatever the rule of law is, it is empirically determined
by and derived from the struggles of human history. Like any other human relationship, the rule
of law is a result of human invention arising in the course of endeavors to improve the regulation
of conduct. The rule of law, says Oakeshott, "stands for a mode of human relationship that has
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been glimpsed, sketched in a practice, unreflectively and intermittently enjoyed, half-understood,
left indistinct: and the task of reflectionis not to invent some hitherto unheard of human
relationship, but to endow this somewhat vague relationship with a coherent character by
distinguishing its condition as exactly as may be."165 Now, this seems, does it not, to be an
appeal to develop the theory of the rule of law to some extent more than a one-sentence
imprecision.
The conditions Oakeshott identifies in this essay as elements which characterize the mode
of association that we call the rule of law parellel the traditional tripartite separation of powers.166
Although his main attempt is to derive from the rule of law the doctrine of the separation of
powers, a task he accomplishes in admirable fashion, he also metnions foreseeability,
knowability, certainty, and generality as intergral to the rule of law,167 inadvertantly (perhaps)
incorporating much of Haye's formulation. Additionally, in his work On Human Conduct
Oakeshott discusses "attributes intrinsic to association in terms of non-prudential rules," which
sounds suspiciously close to rule of law as the association in terms of laws. These attributes are
"the quality of legal subjects; rules not arbitrary, secret, retroactive or awards to interests; the
independence of judicial proceedings...; no so-called 'public' or 'quasi-public' enterprise or
corporation exempt from common liability for wrong, no offense without specific prescription;
no penalty without specific offence; no disability or refusal of recongition without established
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inadequacy of subscription; no outlawry, etc., etc."168He even calls such a list the "inner morality"
of a legal system, as Fuller does.169It is difficult to make a case that Oakeshott is a stranger to the
ascribing a list of elements to the rule of law, even though some of the items on his list may be
best transferred to alist of devices.
Obviously a thinker who would so restrict the nature of law is no advocate of legal
positivism. To establish on the part of Oakeshott acceptance of the above list of elements in
principle rejects positivism as an adequate explanation of the nature and authority of law.
Additionally, Oakeshott takes pains to distinguish rule by policy and the rule of law.170
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